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IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN OHIO HOME SALES
I. INTRODUCTION
The law should be based on current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending
need for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times.
Ancient distinctions which make no sense in today's society and
tend to discredit the law should be readily rejected. . . '
A PURCHASER IN OHIO OF A TWO DOLLAR FOUNTAIN PEN would probably
be pleased to know that the law has provided certain warranties
with the purchase of the pen.2 If the same individual chooses to pur-
chase a $100,000 house, he may be shocked to discover that the law pro-
vides no similar warranties in the sale of real estate.' An unwary pur-
chaser in Ohio may still be a victim of the harsh common law doctrine of
caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware." The majority of states other
than Ohio have rejected the caveat emptor doctrine and adopted an im-
plied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes,4 but the irony of
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 82, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (1965).
2 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.27 and 1302.28 (Page 1979); see Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: the Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.
Q. 835 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Roberts]; see also McDonald v. Mianecki, 79
N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979).
' Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in the Sales of Real
Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Haskell]. Rather than com-
pare the home buyer's situation to the purchase of a two dollar fountain pen,
Haskell compares the home buyer's situation to the purchase of a dog leash. Id. at
633. The principle is the same for both cases; the buyer of goods seemingly has
more protection under the law than a buyer of realty. Roberts vividly details the
home buyer's circumstances:
Let us imagine that a year later the happy homeowner is busily engaged
in the kitchen mixing himself a martini when he hears a loud crash from
the rumpus room. Lo and behold, there sits that master's bed atop the
piano-the rumpus room ceiling has collapsed! Somewhat perturbed by
this turn of events, the homeowner asks the developer either to repair
or to pay for repairing what appears to have been a rather shoddy piece
of workmanship. Here, however, comes the punch line: caveat emptor
applies to the sale of a new home so that the developer is not liable for
his substandard product. Indeed, the developer may well have been a
collapsible corporation which, like Maeterlinck's bee, ceased to exist
when the last house was sold. Consequently, the irate purchaser may be
deprived even of the opportunity to attack the principle of caveat emp-
tor.
Roberts, supra note 2, at 836.
' See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Wawak v.
Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Polland v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co.,
12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Carpenter v. Donahoe, 154
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this situation is that it was an Ohio case, Vanderschrier v. Aaron,5 that
first recognized implied warranties in the sale of a home.' This Note will
demonstrate that Ohio should adopt an implied warranty of habitability
in the sale of new homes by builder-vendors.
II. HISTORY OF CAVEAT EMPTOR
Few people are unfamiliar with the doctrine of caveat emptor. Legal
training is not necessary to realize that these two simple Latin words
may be used to deny a purchaser relief for defective materials and
workmanship. It can be argued that the simplicity of the doctrine in
part creates the problem in rejecting the doctrine. Hamilton, in his
classic article on caveat emptor, describes this problem:
An adage was never fitted more neatly to the part than caveat
emptor; it is, among many excellent examples, the ideal legal
maxim. It is brief, concise, of meaning all compact. Its terms are
too broad to be pent up within the narrow confines of rules of
law; they are an easy focus for judicial thought, a principle to be
invoked when the going is difficult, a guide to be followed amid
the baffling uncertainties of litigation. The phrase seems to
epitomize centuries of experience; it is written in the language
of Rome, the great law-giver; it comes with the repute of the
classics and with the prestige of authority.7
Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d
200 (1970); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v.
Dye, 4 Ill. App. 3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v. Heuer, 264 Ind. 1, 280
N.E.2d 300 (1972); Krol v. York Terrace Bldg., Inc., 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589
(1977); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.E.2d 503, afJ'd,
384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d
795 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); Norton v. Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975);
Centrella v. Holland Construction Corp., 82 Misc. 2d 537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. 1975); Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557
(1976); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Jones v.
Gatewook, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d
1019 (1974) (en banc); Elderkin v. Gaster, 477 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Lane v.
Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 299 S.E.2d 728 (1976); Waggoner v. Midwestern
Dev. Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554
(Tex. 1968); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975); Klos v. Gockel, 87
Wash. 2d 567, 555 P.2d 1349 (1976) (en banc); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275
(Wyo. 1975).
' 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (8th Dist. 1957).
' Id. at 341-42, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
' Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931)
[hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
Roberts maintains that the Hamilton article is such a classic that it is un-
necessary to footnote it in detail. Roberts, supra note 2, at 836. It should be
noted, however, that Hamilton's article not only details caveat emptor as a legal
doctrine, but also covers the doctrine's history with great interest. To read
Hamilton's article is to be transported to another era by way of his perceptive,
lively and nearly poetic prose.
[Vol. 30:177
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Although caveat emptor seems to arise from "centuries of experience,"
its true origin is unknown. The idea that the buyer must look out for
himself is "alien to the spirit of the civil law."8 Nor can this doctrine be
traced to the law of the merchant. The phrase caveat emptor appears in
print for the first time in England in the 16th century, 0 but came to full
fruition in America." American courts in the 19th century developed the
doctrine as it is understood today, reflecting the country's trend toward
the "creed of laissez faire,"' 2 and today the purchaser in Ohio must pro-
tect himself by an express warranty, or rely solely on the defense of
fraud. 3
One may argue that caveat emptor had some rational basis at a time
when a buyer and seller dealt at arm's length and when the buyer was
knowledgable enough to inspect a simple home for defects. This has not
been the case in the United States since World War II, when homes
began to be built in large numbers:
After World War II. . . . the building industry underwent a
revolution. It became common for the builder to sell the house
and land together in a package deal. Indeed, the building in-
dustry outgrew the old notion that the builder was an artisan
and took on all the color of a manufacturing enterprise, with
acres of land being cleared by heavy machinery and
prefabricated homes being put up almost overnight. 4
Today's home buyer arguably lacks the requisite skills to discover
8 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1157.
9 Id. at 1158. Hamilton states in a note which epitomizes his style that:
The idea is to be found in the elementary formula for Christian mar-
riage; the parties accept each other for better or for worse. In England
from a time unknown until quite recently there has been a limited in-
dulgence in the sale of wives. Even though the law has not accorded
recognition, the bargains have usually stood. Whether the price was a
mug of beer or a lusty sum in gold, it was understood that the buyer
took his chance upon latent defects in the chattle. [citing Kenney, Wife
Selling in England, 45 L.Q. REV. 494 (1929).]
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1162 n.196.
'0 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1164.
" Id. at 1178.
12 Roberts, supra note 2, at 836. Hamilton notes that:
It is a far cry from authoritative control to modern mercantilism. The
English borough sought to guard the gates of the market and deny en-
trance to unworthy goods. The up-to-date state undertakes to instruct
producers how to subordinate goodness in their wares to vendibility.
Yet caveat emptor claims to descend from an ancient lineage.
Hamilton, supra note 7, at 1185.
13 Note, Phasing Out Caveat Emptor: Implied Warranties in Builder-Vendor
Contracts, 2 CAP. U. L. REV. 199, 200 (1973).
'" Roberts, supra note 2, at 837.
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defects that may exist in plumbing, electrical wiring or the actual struc-
ture itself. 5
It appears that some courts have recognized the realities of the
modern real estate transaction, and have adopted the concept of an im-
plied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes. This change
from the common law doctrine of caveat emptor occured in a relatively
short period of time, initiated in 1957 by the Ohio decision in
Vanderschrier." In 1961, the rule that no implied warranties existed in
the sale of new homes appeared to be well established in most jurisdic-
tions.17 By 1969, although most courts still recognized no warranties in
the sale of older buildings, a different trend appeared to be developing
in the sale of new homes. Modern decisions began holding the vendor-
builder liable to original purchasers on a theory of implied warranty of
fitness. 8 The courts found the old rule of caveat emptor did not satisfy
the demands of justice.'9 One commentator recommended that "[i]t
would be better if this enlightened approach were generally adopted
with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend to discourage
much of the sloppy work and jerry-building that has become perceptible
over the years."2 While it appeared in Vanderschrier" that Ohio would
lead the nation in casting out caveat emptor, ultimately the doctrine
was retained.2
III. OHIO LAW
In 1955, a purchaser of a new home in Ohio could only recover from
the builder damages for any defects detected upon possession on the
5 See, e.g., Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). The court
recognized that building construction today is "complex and intertwined with
governmental codes and regulations." Id. at 1279.
1" 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (8th Dist. 1957). See also Hyatt and
Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Con-
dominium & Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1976).
The Hyatt and Rhoads article describes Vanderschrier as "the first chink in the
armor of caveat emptor." Id. at 956.
17 Annot., 78 A.L.R. 446, 447 (1961).
18 See, e.g., Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
19 Id. at 396. It is reasoned that:
[Tihe purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average
family, and in many instances is the most important transaction of a
lifetime; and that to apply the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced
buyer, and in favor of a builder who is daily engaged in the business of
building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of justice.
Id.
20 7 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926A, at 818 (3d ed. 1963).
21 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (8th Dist. 1957).
1 Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
[Vol. 30:177
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theories of fraud or express warranty,"3 and no implied warranties were
recognized in the sale of real estate. Two years later, in Vanderschrier,24
an Ohio appellate court was presented with a case involving the sale of a
home still under construction.25 The court found that few cases in the
United States were on point,26 and adopted the law of England that
"upon the sale of a house in the course of erection, there is an implied
warranty that the house will be finished in a workmanlike manner."'27
The Vanderschrier court accordingly held that:
[Sjufficient credible evidence established the fact that the house
when sold, was still in the course of construction and incomplete;
and the bargain implied in law between the sellers and the
buyers was the completion of the entire house in such a way
that it would be reasonably fit for its intended use, and that the
work would be done in a reasonably efficient and workmanlike
manner.
2 8
Like the rule in England, the implied warranty arose only as to homes
under construction. The Vanderschrier court did, however, go one step
further than England had when it required the completed home to be
"reasonably fit for its intended use."' What is unfortunate is that the
Vanderschrier court refused to acknowledge implied warranties in con-
nection with the sale of a completed home, but then went on to address the
issue regardless. The court stated in dictum that "the vendor of a com-
pleted house, in respect of which there is no work going on and no work
to be done, does not generally in the absence of some express bargain or
warranty, undertake any obligation with regard to the condition of the
house."3"
2 Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (8th Dist. 1957).
24 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (8th Dist. 1957).
25 Id
Id. at 342, 140 N.E.2d at 821.
SId. at 341-42, 140 N.E.2d at 821. The Vanderschrier court was quoting from
Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., Ltd., (1937) 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.).
103 Ohio App. 340, 342, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (8th Dist. 1957).
I& It is interesting to note that although the English rule centered on an
implied warranty of workmanlike construction, concern had there been express-
ed as to the dwelling's habitability. In Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., (1931) 2
K.B. 113, it was stated that "the house which was to be built by the defendants
for the plaintiff should be a house which was habitable and fit for humans to live
in." Id. at 120.
' 103 Ohio App. 340, 341, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (8th Dist. 1957). Vanderschrier
follows both of the English cases of Perry and Miller as to this point. In Perry it
was stated that "lilt is, of course well settled that a vendor of a completed house,
... does not, in the absence of some express bargain, undertake any obligation
with regard to the condition of that house." (1937) 4 All E.R. 390, 392 (C.A.). The
Miller court simply stated that the buyer "can always get an express warranty
19811
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In Rappich v. Altermalt,' decided nine months after Vanderschrier, a
recovery by the plaintiff-purchaser was disallowed where the defect in
construction was not discovered until six years after the defendant-
builder had completed the home. 2 The court relied upon the dictum in
Vanderschrier that no obligation is imposed upon the builder-vendor of
a completed home absent an express bargain," thus retreating to the
doctrine of caveat emptor in such sales. 4 The court rejected the notion
of an implied warranty in the sale of homes. 5 Vanderschrier was
distinguished by pointing out that in said case the house was bought
while being constructed and that there had been a breach of the agree-
ment to complete it in a workmanlike manner. One thing that the Rap-
pich court failed to acknowledge was that the "agreement" breached in
Vanderschrier was one implied in law.
The issue of an implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a new house
finally came before the Ohio Supreme Court in Mitchem v. Johnson.7
The plaintiff-purchasers of an uncompleted home contended that their
house had been built in an unworkmanlike manner, resulting in surface-
water and home damage.38 Tracing the language of Vanderschrier, the
trial court instructed the jury that "it is an implied term of the sale that
the builder will complete the house in such a way that it will be
reasonably fit for its intended use and that the work be done in a
reasonably efficient and workmanlike manner."39 The Ohio Supreme
Court expressly rejected that part of the instruction which stated that
construction "will be reasonably fit for its intended use,"" and in so do-
ing overruled, sub silentio, the corresponding excerpt from the holding
in Vanderschrier. The court proceeded to concur with Vanderschrier's
"workmanlike manner" standard for completion of construction.4' To
that an unfurnished house is fit for habitation, if he is prepared to pay the price
which attaches to an unfurnished house which has such a warranty .... (1931) 2
K.B. 113, 121.
", Rappich v. Altermalt, 106 Ohio App. 282, 151 N.E.2d 253 (10th Dist. 1957).
32 Id.
IId at 284, 151 N.E.2d at 255.
3 Id.
35 Id
3 Id
17 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d 594 (1966).
Id at 67, 218 N.E.2d at 595. It is interesting to note that in Vanderschrier
serious water-related problems (ie., the sewer hook-ups) were the apparent basis
for recovery against the builder.
Id at 68, 218 N.E.2d at 596 (emphasis added). The portion of the above jury
instruction appearing in italics is an exact quote from the holding in
Vanderschrier. 103 Ohio App. 340, 342, 140 N.E.2d 819, 821 (8th Dist. 1957).
,0 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 73, 218 N.E.2d 594, 599 (1966).
41 Id
[Vol. 30:177
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achieve this result the Ohio Supreme Court employed elipsis when
quoting Vanderschrier, carefully excising the language "will be
reasonably fit for its intended use,".42 but never expressly admitting to
their so doing. The precise standard adopted by the court was borrowed
from a Missouri case4" which held: "It is the duty of the builder to per-
form his work in a workmanlike manner; that is the work should be
done as a skilled workman would do it; the law exacting from a builder
ordinary care and skill only.""
The standard adopted in Mitchem was not a new and unique duty, but
rather a "duty historically imposed upon all persons that they measure
their conduct by that of the ordinarily prudent person under all cir-
cumstances. . . -'" The court considered the then available meager col-
lection of cases which had created an implied warranty in favor of pur-
chasers of newly constructed homes and then dismissed them as being
just that: a meager collection of cases."' It upheld the doctrine of caveat
emptor because it was supported by the "overwhelming weight of
authority." 7 The practical effect of the court's decision in Mitchem was
to destroy the enlightened approach of Vanderschrier, while concurrent-
ly firmly entrenching Ohio in the nineteenth century by endorsing an
antiquated doctrine.
The cases decided subsequent to Mitchem were based on the
defendant-builder's duty to perform in a workmanlike manner; implied
warranties were again rejected and caveat emptor controlled.48 The
courts were faced with a problem, however, when the applicable statute
of limitations arose as an issue: Was this an action in tort, or an action
42 Id at 69, 218 N.E.2d at 596.
4 Flannery v. St. Louis Architectural Iron Co., 194 Mo. App. 555, 558, 185
S.W. 760, 761 (1916).
" 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 69, 218 N.E.2d 594, 597 (1966).
" Id at 72, 218 N.E.2d at 599.
48 Id. at 71, 218 N.E.2d at 598.
"' Id. at 70, 218 N.E.2d at 597. The court also considered the relative burdens
of proof under the implied warranty and workmanlike manner theories of
recovery. In a somewhat confused discussion of the matter, it determined that if
it adopted the implied warranty theory, the plaintiff would only have to prove
defect and damages with the "burden of explanation" shifting to the defendants.
Id. at 71, 218 N.E.2d at 598. The court apparently viewed this as an untenable ap-
proach because it believed the plaintiff would not be required to show a failure on
the defendant-builder's behalf to exercise "ordinary care" and "a lack of good
workmanship." Id The unanswered question is why the builder of a house unfit
for habitation should not have the "burden of explanation" shifted to him.
41 See, e.g., Hubler v. Bachman, 12 Ohio Misc. 22, 230 N.E.2d 461 (5th Dist.
1967). In Hubler, the plaintiff-purchaser was unable to prove that the defendant-
builder had not exercised ordinary care and skill and thus the court held for
defendant; the plaintiff was left with a home that had substantial plaster cracking
throughout all the rooms. Id.
19811
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based on contract? Benson v. Dorger" held that the duty owed by the
defendant-builder to the plaintiff-purchaser, that is, the duty to perform
in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, sounded in tort as an ac-
tion for negligence."0 One year later, a different Ohio court came to the
opposite conclusion. In Lloyd v. William Fannin Builders, Inc.,5 the
court determined that the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner
arose out of an implied bargain, and as such the action arose ex con-
tractu.
52
The Benson decision, which held that such an action was based on tort
principles, was expressly overruled in 1977 by Tibbs v. William Fannin
Builders, Inc. Tibbs agreed with Lloyd that this action against the
builder-vendor arose ex contractu,5 and for this reason, the plaintiff-
purchaser's remedy was limited to compensatory damages.5 This con-
clusion flowed from the fact that Ohio courts have traditionally limited
recovery in breach of contract actions to compensatory damages, deem-
ing it unsound to award punitive damages absent a showing of malice.
Judge Keefe, concurring in result,57 did not agree that the cause of ac-
tion was clearly in contract 58 and he apparently saw the defendant's
failure to exercise ordinary care as a tortious act, thereby concluding
that the cause of action was a curious mix of contract and tort.9
" 33 Ohio App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1972). This case was subse-
quently overruled by Tibbs v. Nat'l Home Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369
N.E.2d 1218 (1st Dist. 1977).
1 33 Ohio App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1972). The court held that
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.09 (Page 1953), along with its four years statute of
limitations, applied. Id.
" 40 Ohio App. 2d 507, 321 N.E.2d 738 (10th Dist. 1977).
52 Id at 510, 320 N.E.2d at 741. The court failed to continue its analysis,
however, in discerning whether the action was for breach of a written contract
(whereby the applicable time limit would be the fifteen year limitation period of
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.06 (Page 1981)), or for a breach of an unwritten con-
tract in connection with the implied bargain (whereby the six year limitation
period of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (Page 1981) would be applicable).
52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 369 N.E.2d 1218 (1st Dist. 1977).
Id. at 292, 369 N.E.2d at 1225.
Id at 293, 369 N.E.2d at 1226. It is interesting to note that the concurring
opinion in Tibbs viewed the action as a combination of contract and tort which
would open the door to exemplary damages as well. Id. at 297, 369 N.E.2d at 1228
(Keefe, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Ketcham v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 372, 136 N.E. 145 (1922).
5 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 297, 369 N.E.2d 1218, 1228 (1st Dist. 1977) (Keefe, J.,
concurring).
5 Id-
" Id. The field of products liability has developed an implied warranty which
Prosser describes as "a curious hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract, unique in the law." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 634 (4th ed. 1971).
(Vol. 30:177
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The law in Ohio today remains as that which Mitchem articulated in
1967: There are no implied warranties of habitability in the sale of
homes, the law imposing on the builder only the duty to perform in a
workmanlike manner. The distinction between completed and in-
completed homes has been lost," and the duty now accrues in either
situation. The purchaser of a home, either newly completed or under
construction, must "beware" as caveat emptor still controls the sale in
Ohio.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF HOMES
While Ohio held fast to caveat emptor, the majority of other states
considering the issue followed Vanderschrier's lead by adopting an im-
plied warranty of habitability. In Glisan v. Smolenoke," the Colorado
Supreme Court recognized the growing body of law adopting the war-
ranty theory of recovery,62 and adopted an implied warranty of
habitability in the sale of homes "where the vendor's workmen are still
on the job, and particularly where completion is not accomplished until
the house has arrived at the contemplated condition-namely, finished
and fit for habitation." 3
In light of Ohio's current position, it was ironic for the Glisan court to
state that "[olne of the early decisions in this country on the point is
that written in the case of Vanderschrier v. Aaron [citation omitted]. In
that case . . . the Court held that an implied warranty of fitness for
human habitation existed. We follow the Vanderschrier case.""
Less than a year later, the Colorado Supreme Court was presented
with a similar case, but in this instance the house was completed when
sold. In Carpenter v. Donohue,6 5 the court could find no reason to
distinguish completed homes from those still under construction or near
completion. In fact, the court declared it to be incongruous to treat the
purchaser of a newly completed home differently from the purchaser of
a home under construction,66 and stated that there could be no
reasonable basis for treating the respective purchasers differently. 7
E.g., Tibbs v. Nat'l Home Constr. Corp., 52 Ohio App. 2d 281, 396 N.E.2d
1218 (1st Dist. 1977) (sale of newly constructed home with the court reciting the
workmanlike manner standard). It will be recalled that recovery under
Vanderschrier was premised on the fact that the house was purchased while still
under construction. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
61153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
62 Id. at 279, 387 P.2d at 262.
Id at 279, 387 P.2d at 263.
6 Id Unfortunately, Vanderschrier is not followed in its state of origin, Ohio.
65 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
67 The Carpenter court held that:
[T~he implied warranty doctrine is extended to include agreements be-
19811
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After Carpenter, other states continued to reject the doctrine of
caveat emptor in the sale of completed and incompleted homes, adopting
instead an implied warranty of habitability. 8 Many of these states
followed the "lead" of Vandershrier even though Ohio had not.69
The rationale for the warranty of habitability parallels that for the
implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for particular purpose in
the sale of goods: unequal bargaining positions, modern mass production
methods and protection of the public from dangerously defective items.
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,"0 explains this similarity as follows:
We consider that there are no meaningful distinctions between
Levitt's mass production and sale of homes and the mass produc-
tion and sale of automobiles and that the pertinent overriding
policy considerations are the same....
When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised
model .... he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on
its implied representation that the house will be erected in
reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for
habitation.... The public interest dictates that if ... injury does
result from the defective construction, its cost should be borne
by the responsible developer who is in the better economic posi-
tion to bear the loss .... 7
tween builder-vendors and purchasers for the sale of newly constructed
buildings, completed at the time of contracting. There is an implied war-
ranty that builder-vendors have complied with the building code of the
area in which the structure is located. Where, as here, a home is the sub-
ject of sale, there are implied warranties that the home was built in a
workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation.
Id. at 83-84, 388 P.2d at 402.
See, e.g., Wagoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803
(1967); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Favares v. Hortsman,
542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
11 E.g., Loch Hill Constr. Co., Inc. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979).
The court stated that:
Although the existence of implied warranties arising from the con-
struction and sale of new residential dwellings was first recognized by a
court in this country only a little over two decades ago, Vandershrier v.
Aaron .... since that time judicial acceptance of such warranties has
spread rapidly until at present new home purchasers in over one-half of
the states enjoy the protection of at least some type of implied warranty.
Id. at 721, 399 A.2d at 886-87.
70 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
71 Id. at 90-91, 207 A.2d at 325-26. As indicated by the court, the defendant in
Schipper built homes using mass production methods. This factor was focused
upon by the court in illustrating unequal bargaining power:
Caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an equal
bargaining position and they could readily be expected to protect
themselves in the deed. Buyers of mass produced development homes
are not on an equal footing with the builder-vendors and are no more
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This court, unlike the Ohio courts, rejected the argument that the
builder-vendor would become an insurer. Paralleling the burden of proof
in tort cases, Schipper requires the plaintiff to show "that the house
was defective when constructed and sold and that the defect proximate-
ly caused the injury.""7 The builder-vendor has performed his duty if the
house is reasonably fit for habitation; perfection, therefore, is not re-
quired. 3
It should be noted that Schipper was a 1965 case, and therefore was
decided at a time when the law still favored the builder-vendor and sup-
ported the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of real estate. The
Schipper court refused to follow the traditional rules stating: "Law as
an instruct for justice has infinite capacity for growth to meet changing
needs and mores.''74
In 1979, the New Jersey Supreme Court was again faced with the
issue of implied warranties in the sale of homes. In McDonald v.
Minanecki, even though the defendant was not a developer of mass-
produced homes, the court nevertheless had to consider whether or not
the implied warranty should apply. In affirming for the plaintiff, the
court noted how the law had changed; unlike the situation in 1965, by
1979 most cases deciding the issue of liability favored implied warranty
as a basis for recovery. Support for the decision was found in other
sources including the Uniform Land Transactions Act.
7
1
In reaching its conclusion, the court reiterated the rationales used by
other states to support implied warranties. First, the builder-vendor has
a far superior bargaining position. 77 Also, the buyer often signs a stan-
dard form contract, has not seen the home during the construction, and
relies on the skill of the builder-vendor." An additional reason for im-
able to protect themselves in a deed than are automobile purchasers in a
position to protect themselves in the bill of sale.
Id. at 91-92, 207 A.2d at 326.
" Id. at 92, 207 A.2d at 326.
73 Id
" Id. at 89, 207 A.2d at 324.
71 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979).
Id. at 286, 398 A.2d at 1289. Germane is the UNIFO~m LAND TRANSACTIONS
ACT § 2-309, which provides in its Prefatory Note that:
Perhaps the most important example of modernization of real estate law
[affected] by this Act is Section 2-309 which imposes implied warranties
of quality on persons in the business of selling real estate. For a substan-
tial period of years, the nearly universal opinion of writers on the sub-
ject has been that the old rules of caveat emptor were totally out of date
and pernicious in effect.
13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN., 1979 Pamphlet at 41. See also The National Association
o.f Home Builders, What About H.O.W.-Home Owners Warranty, 60.13 NAT'L
Assoc. HOME BUILDERS 5 (1975).
,7 79 N.J. 275, 289, 398 A.2d 1283, 1290.
,8 Id.
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posing the implied warranty is to discourage sloppy building practices."9
The holding of McDonald expresses the policy and concerns behind
the implied warranty:
Caveat emptor is an outmoded concept and is hereby replaced
by rules which reflect the needs, policies and practices of
modern day living. It is our conclusion that in today's society it
is necessary that consumers be able to purchase new homes
without fear of being "stuck" with an uninhabitable "lemon."
Caveat emptor no longer accords with modern day practice and
should therefore be relegated to its rightful place in the pages of
history.0
Having sounded the death bell for caveat emptor in the sale of new
homes in a great many states, several questions remain concerning the
implied warranty that has replaced it. The following sections explore
these issues: What is a builder-vendor? What is meant by
"habitability"?8' Does the warranty arise from tort or contract? Does
the warranty extend to subsequent purchasers of a new home?
A. Builder-Vendor
The courts have consistently used the phrase "builder-vendor" when
referring to a potentially liable defendant, but not all courts have at-
tempted to define the term. The reason for this is that often the situa-
tion appears self-explanatory and elaboration is not necessasry. The
Texas Supreme Court, in Humber v. Morton,2 discovered that "builder-
vendor" could be defined by reiterating the circumstances of the case:
It conclusively appears that defendant Morton was a "builder-
vendor." The summary judgment proofs disclose that he was in
the business of building or assembling houses designed for
dwelling purposes upon land owned by him. He would then sell
7 The McDonald court cited Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 562 (Tex.
1968) and quoted:
The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism
patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices. It does a
disservice not only to the ordinary prudent purchaser but to the in-
dustry itself by lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night
operator and surveyors of shoddy work.
79 N.J. 275, 290, 398 A.2d 1283, 1290.
" Id. at 299, 398 A.2d at 1295.
" The term "habitability" alone is used, although the courts will usually use
the phrase "implied warranty of workmanlike construction and habitability."
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 125, 228 A.2d 771, 775 (1972). While "workman-
like construction" imports a duty of care in building the home, "habitability" is
more a rigorous standard which focuses upon the quality of the finished product.
See Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
92 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
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the completed houses together with the tracts of land upon
which they were situated to members of the house-buying
public."
The Humber analysis is simple and pragmatic but relies on the builder
being "in the business." The Missouri Supreme Court gave a more
detailed and slightly different explanation in Smith v. Old Warson
Development Co.:"
It should be recognized that the rationale for allowing
recovery by a purchaser of a new house, on a theory of an im-
plied warranty of habitability or quality, is applicable only
against that person who not only had an opportunity to observe
but failed to correct a structural defect, which, in turn became
latent, i.e., the builder-vendor.5
Missouri's definition emphasizes the fact that the defendant was simply
a "builder," while the Texas court's definition emphasizes the fact that
the builder was also a developer. The Missouri rule is the better of the
two as the ultimate focus is only upon who had the best chance of de-
tecting a defect in construction without regard to the frequency of such
opportunities.
In a 1979 decision, " the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was
no reason to distinguish between a builder or contractor who constructs
a home for a specific individual and a builder-developer (one building for
unknown purchasers). 7 The court focused on the expectations of the
buyers in determining whether the defendant was a builder-vendor for
purposes of applying the warranty of habitability:
To the buyer of a home the same considerations are present, no
matter whether a builder constructs a residence on the land of
the owner or whether the builder constructs a habitation on
land he is developing and selling the residential structures as a
part of a package including the land. It is the structure and all
its intricate components and related facilities that are the sub-
ject matter of the implied warranty."
Id. at 555.
479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
Id. at 801.
Moxley v. Faramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
Id. at 735. The Wyoming Supreme Court had adopted the implied warranty
of habitability in the sale of new homes four years prior to the Moxley decision.
Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). In Tavares the defendant-
builder was also a land developer; in Moxley the defendant had built the house
specially for the plaintiffs.
" 600 P.2d at 735. The court expressed its concern that all those who are a
part of the building industry maintain high standards, and that anyone holding
himself out as a builder be treated the same as mass developers. Id.
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The second half of the term, that is, "vendor" or "seller," must also be
considered. In Mazurek v. Nielsen," the central issue was whether or
not the defendants were "sellers." The court found that a builder-
vendor had to be a person "regularly engaged in building, so that the
sale is commercial rather than casual or personal in nature."" In
Mazurek, defendants had hired an architect, contractor and subcontrac-
tor to build their home, and had sold the property to plaintiffs two years
after they moved in. Although the court said the defendants were
"builders" due to these activities, there was a question as to whether or
not they were "sellers." The court reasoned that a builder-seller did not
need a history of selling, and that "[elven a first-time builder-seller may
be 'in the business of building' for purposes of impliedly warranting his
work, if his primary reason for constructing the house is to resell it. The
intent of the builder-seller in this regard is a factual question."9 '
The Mazurek intent test, which was established to protect a pur-
chaser, served to deny a purchaser relief in a subsequent case. In Sloat
v. Mathing,92 defendant built a home with the intention of occupying it
himself, and due to financial difficulties, he sold the home to the plaintiff
instead. The court acknowledged that implied warranties were not
restricted to large scale developers, but held that an element of com-
merciality was required. 3 The court reasoned that the policy motives
for preventing shoddy workmanship did not apply in a case like this,
where one built a home for his own use.9
The cases in this section were decided in different states, but some
similarities emerge. Where the defendant is the actual builder of the
home, whether or not he is a developer, and he sells the home directly
to the plaintiff, the defendant is a "builder-vendor." More difficult ques-
tions arise where the facts vary; if the defendant builds the home for his
own use, but sells it to another person, the courts may deny an aggrieved
party's action based on the lack of commerciality. Conversely, other
courts might focus on the policy of ensuring good workmanship in new
homes, and therefore hold the builder-vendor liable. The latter is the
" 599 P.2d 269 (Colo. App. 1979).
" Id. at 271. The court pointed out that the intervening occupancy of the de-
fendants subsequent to completion but prior to sale did not operate to cut off the
implied warranty. Id., citing Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d
637 (Colo. 1978) (warranty extends to subsequent purchasers if it was the original
builder-vendor who repurchased and sold the house).
"' 599 P.2d at 271.
92 605 P.2d 71 (Colo. App. 1980).
93 Id. at 72.
, Id. The dissent in Sloat reasoned that the implied warranty was designed
to protect the purchasers of the home, and that the element of commerciality had
little to do with quality of construction accorded occupants. Id. at 74 (Sternberg,
J., dissenting).
[Vol. 30:177
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss1/12
IMPLIED WARRANTIES
better rule as the focus should be on the safety of occupants, not on the
builder-vendor's state of mind.
B. Habitability
The implied warranty of habitability has covered a wide variety of
defects: cracked walls, buckled ceilings,9 defective septic tanks" and
leaking roofs. 8
The question remains: What is habitability? The Illinois Supreme
Court, in Peterson v. Hubschman Construction Co.,99 defined habitabil-
ity as "a warranty that the house, when completed and conveyed to the
vendees, would be reasonably suited for its intended use." ' The Peter-
son court emphasized that the implied warranty arose from the agree-
ment between the parties, and compared it to the implied warranties in
the Uniform Commercial Code: "It would more accurately convey the
meaning of the warranty as used in this context if it were to be phrased
in language similar to that used in the Uniform Commercial Code, war-
ranty of merchantability, or warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose."0 ' What is "fit" or "merchantable" necessarily depends on the
facts of each case,' 2 but it is generally agreed that the builder is held to
a standard of reasonableness, not perfection.'
The implied warranty of habitability is not met by the mere fact that
a purchaser is inhabiting a builder-vendor built house. In Peterson, the
court was presented with a unique situation where the defendant
asserted that the implied warranty of habitability could only be
resorted to if the defects made the structure unfit for habitation. The Il-
linois Supreme Court rejected this argument: "The mere fact that the
house is capable of being inhabited does not satisfy the implied warran-
ty.' 04
" Carpenter v. Donahoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
" Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr.
648 (1974).
17 Hoagland v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 215, 572 P.2d 493 (1977).
"0 Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970).
9 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
,00 Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
,o, Id. at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. For a similar analogy see Yepsen v. Burgess,
269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974).
102 See, e.g., Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 247 (Me. 1979); Loch Hill Constr.
Co., Inc., v. Ficke, 284 Md. 708, 399 A.2d 883 (1979); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or.
635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974).
103 See Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc., 406 A.2d 88 (Me. 1979); Schip-
per v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
"14 Peterson v. Habschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 41, 889 N.E.2d 1154, 1158
(1979).
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In Banville v. Huckins,"'° the court declared that not every simple
defect would render a house nonhabitable."' For purposes of applying
the warranty, BanviUle established the following test: "Whether or not a
particular defect renders the dwelling 'unsuitable' necessarily requires
inquiry as to whether a reasonable person faced with such a defect
would be warranted in concluding that a major impediment to habita-
tion existed."' 
0 7
The warranty of habitability has been extended beyond the struc-
tures themselves to include the selection of the site.' 8 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained in Elderkin v. Guster,0 0 that a "developer
holds himself out, not only as a construction expert, but as one qualified
to know what sorts of lots are suitable for the types of homes to be con-
structed.""... Thus, the complete "home" may be covered by this war-
ranty, which then gives the term "habitability" a very broad base.
From this overview, it is apparent that the implied warranty of
habitability places a greater duty on the defendant than the negligence
standard of workmanlike manner. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in
Tavares v. Horstman,"' observed that a buyer may proceed not only
upon the basis of implied warranty but upon the basis of negligent
design and construction. There obviously can be and probably is in some
cases an indistinguishable overlap, but an implied warranty would em-
brace the wider range of causes and be less restrictive of proof."2 Pur-
chasers would be accorded the fullest protection by requiring the
builder-vendor to satisfy an implied warranty of habitability and work-
manlike construction.
C. Contract or Tort?
The implied warranty, be it habitability, fitness or workmanlike man-
ner, arises from the agreement between the buyer and seller,"3 yet the
rationale for the development of this essentially common law"' warran-
ty sounds distinctly in tort: protection of innocent purchasers. The
courts have analogized the implied warranty of habitability to the
10 407 A.2d 294 (Me. 1979).
106 Id. at 297.
107 Id.
"Io Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972).
10 Id.
110 Id. at 130, 288 A.2d at 777.
542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
112 Id at 1282.
See Lloyd v. William Fannin Builders, Inc., 40 Ohio App. 2d 507, 320 N.E.2d
738 (10th Dist. 1973).
.. See notes 59-79 supra and accompanying text.
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developing law of products liability,"' and in Schipper, the New Jersey
court seemed to use "implied warranty" and "strict liability" almost in-
terchangeably."'
The issue of whether the implied warranty is based in contract or tort
becomes important when builder-vendor liability to second or subse-
quent purchasers is at issue. In Monley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., ' the
implied warranty of habitability was extended to cover subsequent pur-
chasers where the damage was foreseeable and caused by the builder-
vendor's negligence."' The court was careful to point out that the war-
ranty ran to subsequent purchasers for only a reasonable time and only
in connection with latent defects." 9 The court failed, however, to in-
dicate whether the action was based on either tort or contract, or both.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rooney expressed his concern that
the majority failed to indicate the basis of the claim and that this would
cause confusion over matters including whether Wyoming's com-
parative negligence statute would be available.7 0
In Crowder v. Vandendeal'"' the Missouri Supreme Court was con-
fronted with an action by a second purchaser of a home, and discussed
the issue of whether the implied warranty was grounded in tort or con-
tract. The court held that the warranty was contractual, and therefore
limited to first purchasers. The court reasoned that liability is based on
the transaction between the buyer and seller, not the conduct of the
builder. 2 In other words, the warranty arises from the contract of sale.
"' See, e.g., Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en
banc), where the court directed that "in this state implied warranty is a tort con-
cept not a contract right." Id. at 798.
"' 44 N.J. at 96, 207 A.2d at 328. The court stated that:
[Tihe plaintiffs may rely not only on the principles of negligence but also
on the implied warranty or strict liability principles .... [E]ven under im-
plied warranty or strict liability principles, the plaintiff's burden still re-
mains of establishing to the jury's satisfaction from all the circumstances
that the design was unreasonably dangerous and proximately caused the
injury.
Id. "Unreasonably dangerous," an element of strict liability, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1962), was here declared an element of proving the im-
plied warranty. The court failed, however, to specify whether it wished to treat
the implied warranty of habitability as a concept of tort.
". 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
"' Id. at 736.
119 I&
20 Id. at 737.
21 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978).
' Id. at 881. The court noted that "[t]he warranty, from which liability arises,
is an independently implied covenant arising by reason of the purchase which
survives the deed." Id. n.3. The reference to surviving the deed is a reference to
the doctrine of "merger." Merger, a creature of policy, is somewhat of a justifica-
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The court further reasoned that, where appropriate, there may be tradi-
tional contractual defenses available to the builder-vendor.'23 Only the
parties to the contract determine the terms and conditions of the agree-
ment, and the court endorsed for certain situations the execution of a
valid disclaimer, although it stated that boiler plate clauses would be in-
effective.'24 The adoption of the contract basis of recovery effected a
substantial limitation upon subsequent purchasers' ability to recover for
latent defects which were dormant while the original purchasers oc-
cupied the house. It seems unfortunate that Texas would eliminate
caveat emptor to protect innocent first purchasers, but still retain a
privity requirement for recovery which then bars subsequent pur-
chasers.
The Indiana Supreme Court, on the other hand, rejected the contract
theory because of the privity requirement which follows it.'25 In Barnes
v. MacBrown & Co., Inc.,'26 the second purchaser bought the home after
the original purchasers had occupied it for only three years. The court
extended the implied warranty, stating that the requirement of privity
was outmoded given the increasing complexity of today's technology.'
This extension, however, did not go to all defects, but was limited to "la-
tent defects, not discoverable by a subsequent purchaser's reasonable
inspection, manifesting themselves after purchase."'2 8
tion for the doctrine of caveat emptor. When a contract of sale culminated in the
execution of a deed, any warranty or promise not expressly retained was "merg-
ed" into the deed and lost. In Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), the
court dismissed the merger doctrine as archaic, stating that "[tihe cases which
give some weight to the doctrine of merger in the implied warranty situation
hold that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to sales of real property, thus
reducing the 'merger' theory to the status of a 'unicorn hunting bow.' "Id. at 556.
113 564 S.W.2d at 882. The court in effect established a privity requirement
which barred subsquent purchasers from recovering. The rationale for this was
that "[tihe first purchaser is the only one with whom the builder may negotiate
an allocation of risk." Id.
"' Id. at 881. The court sounded a note of caution by adding that:
[Olne seeking the benefit of such a disclaimer must not only show a con-
spicuous provision which fully disclosed the consequences of its inclusion
but also that such was in fact the agreement reached. The heavy burden
thus placed upon the builder is completely justified, for by his assertion
of the disclaimer he is seeking to show that the buyer has relinquished
protection afforded him by public policy. A knowing waiver of this pro-
tection will not be readily implied.
Id. n.4 (emphasis in original).
125 Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., Inc., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 611 (1976).
126 Id.
Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
Id. at 229, 342 N.E.2d at 621. See also Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes,
Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo. 1978). Here, the Colorado Supreme Court extended the
warranty to subsequent purchasers only on the narrow facts of where the
original builder-vendor repurchased the home from the original purchaser and
then sold it. Id. at 638.
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There was a strong dissent in Barnes which emphatically declared
that the case must be governed by the law of contracts, not the law of
torts.129 The defendant did not negotiate a contract with the plaintiffs in
this case, and therefore had nothing to do with determining the pur-
chase price of the home or the allocation of risk. While this dissent
makes a well-reasoned point, it would nonetheless appear to be better in
the balance of things to protect purchasers, original and subsequent, by
placing the burden of inspection and quality upon the builder-vendor,
the person in the best position to detect unworkmanlike construction.
At this point it is difficult to predict with certainty how other states
will decide cases requiring a delineation of the basis of the implied war-
ranty of habitability.13 ° Those states that emphasize the contractual
nature of the warranty, as the Texas Supreme Court did in Crowder,
will limit it to first purchasers; the states that focus on the policy behind
the warranty will dispense with privity and find for the second pur-
chaser. The implied warranty has only arisen and developed over a
period of approximately twenty years, and the courts have based their
decisions on the facts of each case. Perhaps it will be the task of the
state legislature to create a rule of law which can be equitably and con-
sistently applied in all controversies requiring a remedy, thus ending ad
hoc judicial drafting in this area of law.
D. Adopting the Implied Warranty of Habitability in Ohio
Given the appropriate case, the Ohio Supreme Court should overrule
that part of Mitchem which denied the existence of the implied warran-
ty of habitability in the sale of new homes. The rationale for Mitchem
has been completely eroded since that case was decided in 1967. The
Missouri case upon which Mitchem was based has since been judicially
abandoned, and Missouri now recognizes the implied warranty of
habitability. 3 ' Concurrently, most courts today have rejected caveat
emptor in the sale of new homes. It is clear that the more "enlightened
approach" would be to reject caveat emptor.'32
The court in Mitchem accurately predicted the effect of an implied
warranty of habitability: Once the plaintiff has established the existence
of the defect, and it is found to make the home unfit or uninhabitable,
the builder-vendor will be liable. This should not, however, be viewed as
requiring the builder-vendor to insure the purchaser against loss.
Rather this should be viewed as requiring the builder-vendor to bear
the burden of remedying those defects, and the damages resulting
264 Ind. at 230, 342 N.E.2d at 621.
130 See generally Note, Implied Warranties in New Home Construction:
Caveat Ohio Purchasers, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 207 (1977).
31 Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
132 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926A (1963).
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therefrom, which the builder-vendor caused through its own craftsman-
ship. ' It seems inconsistent that the legislature of Ohio could pro-
mulgate a statute creating warranties for the purchaser of a con-
dominium, 34 and yet provide no warranty protection, either by statute
or through case law, for the purchaser of a house.
V. CONCLUSION
Ohio is still at the starting line when it comes to protecting the pur-
chasers of new homes, but enjoys a concomitant opportunity to glean
the best from the decisions of other courts, because of their position in
this area of law.
Ohio moved quickly in the area of products liability, recognizing the
necessity of discarding "legal concepts of the past to meet new condi-
tions and practices of one changing and progressing civilization.'"" It is
now time for Ohio to follow through with what it began in
Vanderschrier and discard the caveat emptor doctrine and adopt a com-
prehensive implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes.
A problem that could arise in Ohio is one that has appeared in other
courts: confusing the concepts of contract and tort. The Ohio Supreme
Court treats commercial implied warranties as actions in tort and has
stated they are "virtually indistinguishable" from actions in strict
liability.'4 This should not be the case with implied warranties in the
sale of new homes; the action should be based on contract principles, as
the majority of states so hold, thus preserving the requirement of notice
and allowing the parties to allocate risk as they deem appropriate. The
privity requirement could be relaxed for the protection of subsequent
purchasers by simply assigning the original purchaser's allocation of
risk with the builder-vendor to the subsequent purchaser.
SUSAN B. BROOKS
"' See, e.g., House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 928, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.25(E) (Page 1981). See generally Blackburn and
Melia, Ohio Condominium Law Reform: A Comparative Critique, 29 CASE W.
RES. L. REV 145 (1978).
13. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248, 147 N.E.2d 612,
616 (1958).
136 Temple v. Wean, 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 320, 364 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1977).
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